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LEGISLATIVE REFORM OR LEGALIZED THEFT?: 
WHY CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE MUST BE 
OUTLAWED IN OHIO 
ALEX HALLER
*
 
ABSTRACT 
Civil asset forfeiture is a legal method for law enforcement to deprive United 
States citizens of their personal property with little hope for its return. With varying 
degrees of legal protection at the state level, Ohio legislators must encourage national 
policy reform by outlawing civil asset forfeiture in Ohio. Ohio Revised Code Section 
2981.05 should be amended to outlaw civil asset forfeiture by requiring a criminal 
conviction prior to allowing the seizure of an individual’s property. This Note 
proposes two plans of action that will restore Ohio resident’s property rights back to 
those originally afforded in the United States Constitution.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“[Civil asset forfeiture] has become a tool for unscrupulous law 
enforcement officials, acting without due process, to profit by destroying 
the livelihood of innocent individuals, many of whom never recover the 
lawful assets taken from them. When the rights of the innocent can be so 
easily violated, no one’s rights are safe.”1 
In April 2013, police stopped James Leonard in Texas for a traffic violation.2 A 
subsequent search of the vehicle lead law-enforcement officers to a safe in the trunk, 
which contained $201,100 and a bill of sale for a Pennsylvania home.3 Law 
enforcement officials immediately seized the money, citing their belief that the funds 
were “substantially connected to criminal activity,” including the sale of narcotics, a 
practice permitted under the state’s civil asset forfeiture laws.4 James Leonard’s 
mother (“Ms. Leonard”) claimed to be the rightful owner of the money from the house 
sale and sued the government to regain it.5 Ms. Leonard appealed an adverse trial court 
verdict, where unfortunately the Texas Trial Court’s holding was affirmed.6 The 
Appellate Court agreed that Ms. Leonard’s testimony regarding her ownership of the 
property was not sufficient and she did not meet the criteria for the innocent owner 
                                                          
 1  REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., THE REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM 15 (2016), https://prod-
cdn-static.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL[1]-ben_1468872234.pdf. 
 2  Ewan Watt & Jordan Richardson, Justice Thomas Defends Victims of ‘Policing for 
Profit’, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 10, 2017), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/445644/civil-
asset-forfeiture-clarence-thomas-asks-if-its-constitutional; $201,100.00 U.S. Currency v. State, 
No. 09-14-00478-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 7341, at *1 (Tex. App. July 16, 2015), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 847 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (agreeing in the judgment on procedural 
grounds but seriously questioning “whether modern civil –forfeiture statutes can be squared 
with the Due Process Clause and our Nation’s history”). 
 3  Watt & Richardson, supra note 2; Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 847. 
 4  Watt & Richardson, supra note 2; Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 847 (holding the “suspicious 
circumstances” of the stop and contradictory stories about the money provided by the 
passengers of the vehicle was sufficient for the government to show “by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the money was either the proceeds of a drug sale or intended to be used in such a 
sale”). 
 5  $201,000.00 U.S. Currency, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 7341, at *2. 
 6  Id. at *10. 
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defense.7 Ms. Leonard subsequently appealed her case to the United States Supreme 
Court challenging the constitutionality of the procedures used to adjudicate the seizure 
of her property.8 Specifically, Ms. Leonard argued that the Due Process Clause9 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution required the state of Texas 
to carry its burden by clear and convincing evidence rather than by a preponderance 
of the evidence.10 Due to procedural issues, the Supreme Court declined to hear her 
case, leaving her with little recourse to see the money again.11 
Although the prior case occurred in Texas, civil asset forfeiture is not a practice 
Ohioans are fully protected from.12 In fact, Ohioans are often subjected to the same 
kind of civil asset forfeiture as Ms. Leonard in Texas. Take Ricardo Fletcher for 
example. During November 2015, Fletcher attempted to ascertain a friend’s 
whereabouts by leveraging GPS tracking on his phone.13 The search ultimately lead 
Fletcher to a bloody vehicle with its windows broken on a street in Cleveland, Ohio.14 
Immediately upon making this discovery, Fletcher contacted law enforcement.15 The 
following day, Fletcher returned to the scene and while conversing with a woman, 
both of them noticed a gun in their vicinity and subsequently contacted police.16 When 
police arrived, Fletcher consented to a search of his vehicle and provided a DNA 
sample upon law enforcement’s request.17 Following the search of his vehicle, police 
located and seized $20,000 in cash that belonged to Fletcher.18 No indictment or 
charges of any kind were ever filed.19 Nor were any forfeiture proceedings, civil or 
                                                          
 7  Id. at *11 (“The innocent owner defense requires a person whose property has been 
seized for forfeiture to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she: ‘(a) acquired or 
perfected her ownership interest before or during the act or omission giving rise to forfeiture; 
and (b) did not know and reasonably should not have known of that act or omission.’”). 
 8  Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 847. 
 9  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”). 
 10  Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 847. 
 11  Id. at 850 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that as Ms. Leonard raised her due process 
claims for the first time in the Supreme Court, the Texas Court of Appeals lacked the 
opportunity to address them in the first instance). 
 12  See Nick Sibilla, Ohio Now Requires Criminal Convictions for Many Civil Forfeiture 
Cases, FORBES (Jan. 4, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2017/01/04/ohio-now-requires-criminal-
convictions-for-many-civil-forfeiture-cases/#172fbac755cf. 
 13  In re Seizure of Approximately $20,000 U.S. Currency, No. 104850, 2017 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 1451, at *2 (Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2017). 
 14  Id.  
 15  Id.  
 16  Id. 
 17  Id.  
 18  Id.  
 19  Id. at *3. 
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criminal, initiated against him.20 Fletcher complied with all of law enforcement’s 
demands during the ongoing investigation.21 Yet, he still had his life savings seized 
and found himself navigating Ohio’s civil asset forfeiture laws in an attempt to reclaim 
it.22 After two years in the legal system, Fletcher received an appellate verdict in his 
favor, affirming the trial court’s holding requiring law enforcement to return his 
$20,000.23  
Each year, the United States’ government seizes hundreds of millions of dollars in 
cash and property prior to establishing a legal owner’s guilt or innocence.24 Law 
enforcement agencies use federal and state forefeiture laws to perform these seizures 
and strip American citizens of their property.  Civil asset forfeiture, also referred to as 
civil forfeiture, has become so wide-spread that by 2014, law enforcement officers 
took more property “legally” than all home and office burglaries combined.25 Under 
these laws, the government can seize an individual’s cash or property on the mere 
suspicion that it is connected to criminal activity; no actual proof is required.26 
Additionally, in most cases, no charges or convictions against an individual are 
required for law enforcement to seize the property.27  
Once property has been seized, property owners must traverse through the legal 
system in their attempt to reclaim it, absent the right to counsel as afforded in a 
criminal trial.28 A report by the Institute of Justice found that 87% of forfeitures were 
civil, not criminal, due to dismissed charges.29 “It’s troubling that 87% of the time the 
conviction appears to be irrelevant,” declared Lisa Knepper, co-author of the Institute 
of Justice report.30 The report’s statistics illustrate law enforcement’s favoritism 
towards conducting cash and property seizures under the lower standards of evidence 
                                                          
 20  Id.  
 21  Id. at *9 (“[T]he state only made a bare assertion that the investigation was ongoing and 
that Fletcher was a person of interest, without presenting any evidence of a current ongoing 
investigation regarding the homicide and Fletcher.”). 
 22  Id. at *2. 
 23  Id. at *9 (holding the trial court properly granted Fletcher’s motion for the return of the 
seized funds). 
 24  Dick Carpenter et al., Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture, INSTITUTE 
FOR JUSTICE 5 (2d ed. Nov. 2015), https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/policing-for-
profit-2nd-edition.pdf. 
 25  Alex Emmons, Jeff Sessions Wants to Make “Legalized Theft” Great Again, INTERCEPT 
(July 20, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/07/20/jeff-sessions-wants-to-make-legalized-
theft-great-again/. 
 26  Id.; Carpenter, supra note 24, at 2. 
 27  Emmons, supra note 25. 
 28  Id.; see also Carpenter, supra note 24, at 12. 
 29  Nathan Pemberton, Report: Law Enforcement Is on a Property-and-Cash-Seizure Binge 
and Just Can’t Get Enough, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 10, 2015), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/11/police-seizing-more-money-than-ever.html. 
 30  Id. 
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required by civil forfeiture proceedings as compared to criminal.31 Not surprisingly, 
the same study found that 88% of Department of Justice civil forfeitures were never 
challenged.32 Reasons for not challenging a civil forfeiture in court can range from the 
“inability to afford a lawyer,” to “miss[ing the] deadline to file a claim,” which results 
in the property in question being presumed “guilty” and permanently taken from its 
owner.33 Lawmakers should see a desperate need for civil asset forfeiture policy 
reform when statistics show for every ten forfeitures, fewer than two property owners 
ever see a day in court.34  
Proponents of civil asset forfeiture see it as a method to thwart criminal enterprises 
and prevent drug trafficking, as it allows the seizure of cash and other assets.35 It is 
also arguably an efficient method because it allows law enforcement agencies to use 
seized proceeds to further battle illegal activity.36 Law enforcement agencies are able 
to direct the cash and proceeds of property seized towards law enforcement purposes, 
therefore harming criminals economically and helping law enforcement financially.37 
While these goals sound virtuous in theory, statistics show civil forfeiture laws have 
allowed the spread of an aggressive brand of policing that has spurred the seizure of 
hundreds of millions of dollars in cash from motorists and others never charged with 
crimes.38 A Washington Post investigation found that thousands of people have been 
                                                          
 31  See supra text accompanying notes 29–30. 
 32  Pemberton, supra note 29.  
 33  Id.; see also Carpenter, supra note 24, at 12. The report highlights the varying state civil 
forfeiture litigation processes and argues that citizens do not have much of an option to go 
without legal representation in a civil forfeiture case: 
Illinois offers a particularly egregious example of how civil forfeiture laws discourage 
people from even trying to get their property back. In Illinois, to challenge a seizure in 
court, property owners must first pay a bond of $100 or 10 percent of the property’s 
value, whichever is greater. The only exceptions are for personal property worth more 
than $150,000 and for real property. Id. If owners challenge and lose, they must pay the 
full cost of the civil forfeiture proceedings, including the government’s legal costs, and 
give up the full value of the bond. Even if they win, they lose 10 percent of the bond on 
top of whatever attorney costs they accrued. 
Carpenter, supra note 24, at 12. 
 34  See Pemberton, supra note 29.  
 35  Michael Sallah et al., Stop and Seize, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/06/stop-and-
seize/?utm_term=.cd5c70cf8cd5. 
 36  Marian Williams et al., Policing for Profit the Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture, INSTITUTE 
FOR JUSTICE 25 (March 2010), 
https://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other_pubs/assetforfeituretoemail.pdf. 
 37  German Lopez, Jeff Sessions Is Letting Police Take More People’s Stuff Even if They 
Aren’t Convicted of a Crime, VOX (July 19, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2017/7/18/15985810/jeff-sessions-civil-asset-forfeiture; see also Sallah, supra note 35. 
 38  Sallah, supra note 35; see also Nick Sibilla, Cops in Texas Seize Millions By ‘Policing 
for Profit,’ FORBES (June 5, 2014), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2014/06/05/cops-in-texas-seize-millions-by-
policing-for-profit/#354c51071a81 (“Between 2001 and 2007, law enforcement agencies seized 
and kept over 35,000 cars, homes and electronics, forfeiting more than $280 million. District 
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forced to fight legal battles that can last more than a year.39 Due to the uncertainty as 
to whether their money will be returned, most property owners walk away and cut 
their losses.40 
Civil asset forfeiture has been employed for centuries under various justifications, 
providing tens of thousands of Americans little recourse to retrieve lawful property 
that never should have been the subject of a seizure.41 Civil asset forfeiture is a 
violation of an individual’s constitutional property rights afforded by the Article I, 
Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution42 and violation of the Due Process Clause43 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This practice further 
violates the procedural presumption of “innocence until proven guilty” afforded in 
criminal trials, which makes the American justice system so unique. As civil asset 
forfeiture laws generally place the burden of proof on the owner of the property and 
impose lower standards on law enforcement officers for seizing property, those who 
cannot afford to attend court and reclaim their property are more heavily impacted by 
these practices.44 To restore Ohio citizen’s property rights to those afforded within the 
United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, various subsections of section 
2981 of the Ohio Revised Code, must be further amended to ban civil asset forfeiture 
by requiring a criminal conviction prior to permitting forfeiture proceedings. 
Additionally, greater reporting requirements must be imposed on Ohio law 
enforcement agencies to provide the public with transparency into their forfeiture 
activities.  
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part II provides a brief history of civil asset 
forfeiture law in the United States and gives a high-level overview of current state of 
federal and state civil asset forfeiture laws. Part III outlines Ohio’s civil asset forfeiture 
laws under the Ohio Revised Code and highlights the major changes resulting from 
the legislative reform that took effect in 2017. Although Ohio’s forfeiture reform was 
a step in the right direction, this Note argues Ohio’s legislators can go further in their 
protection of the United States Constitution and Ohio Constitution by further 
amending these laws. Part IV outlines a proposal for reform to Ohio’s civil forfeiture 
laws that adheres to the constitutional principles outlined by our founding fathers. 
                                                          
attorneys have used these forfeiture funds on ridiculous purchases, including visiting casinos, a 
vacation to Hawaii and a margarita machine, as seen in the video below.”). 
 39  Sallah, supra note 35. 
 40  Id. 
 41  Id. 
 42  OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and possessions, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and 
no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the person and things to be seized.”). Ohio adopted this 
identical language from the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
 43  See supra text accompanying note 9. 
 44  Sallah, supra note 35 (stating that the burden shifts to the owners to regain their property, 
meaning those who cannot afford attorneys are in trouble).  
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Lastly, Part V offers a brief conclusion to the Note and encourages Ohio citizens to 
demand civil asset forfeiture be outlawed in Ohio in an effort to continue paving the 
way for reform across the United States. 
II. BACKGROUND: CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. A Brief History of Civil Asset Forfeiture 
Civil asset forfeiture is a legal process employed by law enforcement officers to 
seize assets from individuals suspected of involvement in criminal activity without 
necessarily charging the property owners with wrongdoing. The difference between 
criminal and civil forfeiture proceedings is well described by Supreme Court Justice 
Thomas in his concurring opinion in Leonard v. Texas: 
 
When a state wishes to punish one of its citizens, it ordinarily proceeds 
against the defendant personally (known as “in personam”), and in many 
cases it must provide the defendant with full criminal procedural 
protections. Nevertheless, . . . this Court permits prosecutors 
seeking forfeiture to proceed against the property (known as “in rem”) and 
to do so civilly. In rem proceedings often enable the government to seize 
the property without any predeprivation judicial process and to 
obtain forfeiture of the property even when the owner is personally 
innocent (though some statutes, including the one here, provide for an 
innocent-owner defense). Civil proceedings often lack certain procedural 
protections that accompany criminal proceedings, such as the right to a jury 
trial and a heightened standard of proof.45 
 
In a civil forfeiture case, the lawsuit is against the property in question not the 
individual to whom the property actually belongs.46 In these cases, the property owner 
is a third-party claimant and cases are tried in accordance with civil procedure 
requirements.47 A civil forfeiture proceeding is comprised of two separate actions 
conducted by various government officials.48 First, is the actual seizure of the cash or 
property in question.49 Second, is the potential forfeiture of the property based on court 
proceedings.50 Seizure occurs when law enforcement officials confiscate the property 
suspected to be involved in criminal activity from the property owner.51 There are very 
                                                          
 45  Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 847–48 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 46  Jason Snead, Civil Asset Forfeiture: 7 Things You Should Know, HERITAGE FOUNDATION 
(Mar. 26, 2014), https://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/03/civil-asset-forfeiture-7-
things-you-should-know; see also Sallah, supra note 35 (The seized object is listed as the 
defendant in the civil action. “Civil asset forfeiture law is among the more unusual areas of 
American jurisprudence. It does not involve evidence of a crime or criminal charges. It is a civil 
action against an object, such as currency or a boat, rather than a person.”). 
 47  See generally Snead, supra note 46. 
 48  Carpenter, supra note 24, at 8. 
 49  Id. 
 50  Id. 
 51  Id.  
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few limits on what types of property may be seized by law enforcement.52 Reports 
have shown that items seized ranged “from cash, vehicles, airplanes, jewelry, homes, 
musical instruments, farm implements, home furnishings, electronics, and more.”53 
Under federal law, if the owner of the property in question would like to reclaim it, 
the owner must prove beyond a preponderance of the evidence that the property in 
question was not used in criminal activity, thus turning the presumption of innocence 
on its head.54 Once a civil asset has been seized, the appropriate prosecutor’s office 
will file a civil action against the property in order to forfeit it permanently.55 
Therefore, civil asset forfeiture not only deprives a property owner of the use of 
his or her personal property, but it also requires the owner to expend time and 
resources to seek the return of the property in a court of law. When contesting federal 
forfeiture proceedings, a property owner must meet the preponderance of the evidence 
standard in proving that the property in question was not used in criminal activity.56 
Failing to appear to contest asset forfeiture proceedings is grounds for permanent 
removal of the asset from the property owner.57 Whether the federal government 
should be able to take possession of an individual’s property in the absence of a 
judicial finding of guilt has been debated since before American independence.58 
Researchers have found that civil asset forfeiture dates back to British maritime 
laws in the 1600s, where the practice was used as a way to take possession of 
contraband goods from ships’ owners that were, in many cases, located thousands of 
miles away and could not be easily prosecuted.59 Journalist Michael Krieger noted, 
“[i]n the Colonial period, the English Crown issued ‘writs of assistance’ that permitted 
customs officials to enter homes or vessels and seize whatever they deemed 
contraband.”60 Legal scholars have documented how these forfeiture practices angered 
colonists, who saw the writs as “unreasonable searches and seizures” which deprived 
                                                          
 52  Id. 
 53  Id.  
 54  Id. Preponderance of the evidence is required in a civil case, as compared with “beyond 
a reasonable doubt,” which is a more severe test of evidence required to convict in a criminal 
trial. 
 55  Id.  
 56  Id. at 16. 
 57  Snead, supra note 46. 
 58  Michael Krieger, Why You Should Never, Ever Drive Through Tenaha Texas, LIBERTY 
BLITZKRIEG (Aug. 7, 2013), https://libertyblitzkrieg.com/2013/08/07/why-you-should-never-
ever-drive-through-tenaha-texas/#more-7386. 
 59  Id.; Sarah Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER (Aug. 12, 2013), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/12/taken; see also Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 
848, 848–49 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that an English practice of requiring 
forfeiture of offending objects used in violation of customs and revenue “took hold in the United 
States,” where the “First Congress passed laws subjecting ships and cargos involved in customs 
offenses to forfeiture. Other early statutes also provided for the forfeiture of private ships. These 
early statutes permitted the government to proceed in rem under the fiction that the thing itself, 
rather than the owner, was guilty of the crime. And, because these suits were in rem rather than 
in personam, they typically proceeded civilly rather than criminally.”) (citations omitted). 
 60  Krieger, supra note 58. 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss2/9
2019] LEGISLATIVE REFORM OR LEGALIZED THEFT? 303 
 
persons of “life, liberty, or property, without due process” and were among the key 
grievances that triggered the American Revolution.61 
1. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 
Forfeiture in its modern form began with federal statutes passed in the 1970s, 
targeted at organized-crime bosses and drug lords.62 Later amendments allowed the 
seizure of anything thought to have been purchased with tainted funds, whether it was 
connected to the commission of a crime.63 Even then, forfeiture remained an infrequent 
resort until 1984 when Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1984 (“CCCA”).64 The CCCA included a provision that permitted local law 
enforcement agencies to receive up to 80% of the proceeds derived from civil 
forfeitures obtained in joint operations with federal authorities.65 This procedure 
became known as “equitable sharing.”66 Civil forfeiture allowed federal and local 
governments to “extract swift penalties from white-collar criminals and offer 
restitution to victims of fraud,” argued Journalist Sarah Stillman.67 
Prior to the enactment of the CCCA, all proceeds from civil forfeiture proceedings 
were directed to the general fund of the U.S. Treasury.68 After passing the CCCA, all 
federal forfeiture revenue is returned to the very agencies charged with enforcing the 
laws, thus heavily incentivizing civil forfeiture efforts.69 For the first time, 
governmental agencies were permitted to receive a substantial financial benefit and 
use those funds with very limited restrictions.70 Additionally, with the creation of 
“equitable sharing,” state and local agencies coordinating forfeiture efforts with the 
federal government are entitled to receive a portion of the proceeds resulting from the 
                                                          
 61  Id. However, there is still skepticism regarding how heavily this historical practice should 
influence modern day forfeiture procedures. See, e.g., Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 849 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“In the absence of this historical practice, the Constitution presumably would 
require the Court to align its distinct doctrine governing civil forfeiture with its doctrines 
governing other forms of punitive state action and property deprivation. I am skeptical that this 
historical practice is capable of sustaining, as a constitutional matter, the contours of modern 
practice, for two reasons.”) (citation omitted). 
 62  Stillman, supra note 59. 
 63  Id. 
 64  Id. 
 65  Shawn Cantor et al., Civil Asset Forfeiture, Crime, and Police Incentives: Evidence from 
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, NAT’L. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH (Sept. 
2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23873. 
 66  Id.  
 67  Stillman, supra note 59. 
 68  Carpenter, supra note 24, at 2. 
 69  Id. at 5 (“In 1986, the Department of Justice’s Assets Forfeiture Fund took in $93.7 
million in revenue from federal forfeitures. By 2014, annual deposits had reached $4.5 billion—
a 4,667 percent increase. The forfeiture funds of the DOJ and Treasury Department together 
took in nearly $29 billion from 2001 to 2014, and combined annual revenue grew 1,000 percent 
over the period.”). 
 70  Id. at 10 (explaining that law enforcement was “using funds to do everything from 
purchase vehicles to paying overtime”). 
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forfeited assets.71 Soon, states began to follow Congress’s lead by broadening their 
own forfeiture laws, while creating incentives to “police for profit.”72  According to 
the Department of Justice, in 2013, the Asset Forfeiture Fund collected more than $2 
billion from criminal and civil asset forfeiture.73  
B. Attempts at Federal Forfeiture Reform 
1. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 
The CCCA governing forfeited assets has heavily influenced police incentives and 
granted what some argued to be unconstitutional discretion under the law.74 Henry 
Hyde, the Republican chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, stated, in regard 
to civil asset forfeiture law, “[u]nfortunately, I think I can say that our civil-asset-
forfeiture laws are being used in terribly unjust ways and are depriving innocent 
citizens of their property with nothing that can be called due process.”75 Just three 
years later, on April 25, 2000, the 106th United States Congress passed the Civil Asset 
Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (“CAFRA”), which modestly revised the Federal 
criminal code “to establish general rules relating to civil forfeiture proceedings.”76 
Representative Henry Hyde sponsored CAFRA.77 Critics of the reform noted that “it 
left unchanged one of the most troublesome elements of the CCCA, law enforcement’s 
ability to benefit financially from civil forfeiture.”78 
The most significant amendments to federal civil forfeiture proceedings after 
CAFRA included: the establishment of a 90-day requirement for the Government to 
file a complaint for forfeiture or return the property; providing enhanced protections 
for those with standing to contest the forfeiture of the property, but are financially 
unable to obtain representation by counsel, placing the burden of proof in civil 
forfeitures on the Government;79 declaring that the “innocent owner” defense shall not 
                                                          
 71  Id. at 26. 
 72  Id. at 10; see also Stillman, supra note 59. 
 73  Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 5212, 113th Cong. (2014); see also 
Carpenter, supra note 24, at 2 (“The seeds of forfeiture abuse were sown in 1984 when Congress 
expanded federal civil forfeiture laws and created a financial incentive for law enforcement to 
forfeit property.”). 
 74  Kyla Dunn, Reining in Forfeiture: Common Sense Reform in the War on Drugs, 
FRONTLINE, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/forfeiture.html 
(last visited Nov. 27, 2018). 
 75  Stillman, supra note 59. 
 76  Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), Pub. L. No. 106-85, 114 Stat. 202. 
 77  Id. 
 78  Carpenter, supra note 24, at 10. 
 79  Federal civil forfeiture proceedings still apply the “preponderance of the evidence test” 
when determining whether the property in question was used in the commission of a crime. 
However, CAFRA “[d]irects the Government, if its theory of forfeiture is that the property was 
used to commit or facilitate the commission of a criminal offense, or was involved in such 
commission, to establish that there was a substantial connection between the property and the 
offense.” See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), Pub. L. No. 106-85, 114 
Stat. 202. 
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be forfeited under any civil forfeiture statute;80 directing that all civil forfeitures of real 
property and interests in real property proceed as judicial forfeitures; and, enhancing 
Department of Justice reporting requirements to Congress.81 
2. The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014 
Unfortunately, subsequent to the passage of CAFRA, state and local law 
enforcement agencies continued to operate with lax controls surrounding their 
officers’ forfeiture procedures.82 Studies have found when certain states were facing 
fiscal crises, legislators expanded the reach of the state’s forfeiture statutes and 
enabled law enforcement to use the revenues however they saw fit.83  To respond to 
criticisms and overbearing evidence of abuse, Congressmen Tim Walberg introduced 
the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014 in the House of Representatives.84 The 
purpose of the bill is to strengthen personal property rights under the Fifth Amendment 
and to ensure due process of law by reforming civil asset forfeiture laws.85 The bill’s 
supporters argue, under current law, that agencies like the Internal Revenue Service 
and Department of Justice may take property suspected to be in connection with a 
crime without charging the property owner of a crime—a clear violation of due 
process.86 The bill was introduced “to restore the balance of power away from the 
government and back to protecting individual rights and due process.”87 
The bill’s most notable change to current asset forfeiture laws would include 
raising the burden of proof for evaluating a forfeiture from a “preponderance of the 
evidence,” to “clear and convincing evidence,” requiring the government to have more 
concrete proof of the property’s connection to a crime.88 The bill would also shift the 
burden of proof for the “Innocent Owner Defense” from the owner of the property to 
the government.89 It would further expand the reporting requirements for the 
Department of Justice’s Asset Forfeiture Fund, thereby enhancing the Department’s 
reporting requirements to Congress.90 In an attempt to defer to state regulations, the 
bill requires the Department of Justice to ensure “any equitable sharing with local or 
state agencies from forfeitures do not violate state laws or limitations.”91 This 
effectively bans the Department of Justice from sharing forfeitures with states that 
                                                          
 80  It is important to note that while CAFRA affirmed a property owner’s right to declare 
the innocent owner defense, under current federal law the burden is still on the claimant to prove 
that he/she is an innocent owner by a preponderance of the evidence. 
 81  Carpenter, supra note 24, at 10. 
 82  Stillman, supra note 59. 
 83  Id. 
 84  Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 5212, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 85  Id.  
 86  Id.  
 87  Id. 
 88  Id. 
 89  Id. 
 90  Id. 
 91  Id.  
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prohibit civil forfeiture and subjecting the Department of Justice to state guidelines 
for usage of those funds.92 Unfortunately, since being introduced in 2014, the bill only 
has twenty cosponsors and was assigned for revision to the Crime, Terrorism, 
Homeland Security, and Investigations Committee by the House Judiciary.93 
3. Trump vs. Congress in Forfeiture Reform 
In July 2017, the White House took a stance on civil forfeiture at the exact opposite 
end of the spectrum from CAFRA and the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2014 
bill introduced into the House of Representatives.94 Donald Trump’s Justice 
Department revived a federal program that gives state and local law enforcement more 
power to seize property from people who have not been convicted of a crime.95 The 
Justice Department reopened a specific loophole that allows state and local police to 
sidestep state laws through a practice known as adoptive forfeitures.96 The loophole 
allows state and local law enforcement to continue to pillage the property of citizens 
even in the face of local bans on the practice, as long as they refer the case to federal 
agencies after they seize property.97 “The loophole” had been a thirty-year policy of 
the Department of Justice, until the Obama administration banned it in 2015.98 
In an interesting turn of events, the House of Representatives approved an 
amendment to the “Make America Secure and Prosperous Appropriations Act” that 
would roll back the expansions of asset forfeiture under the Trump administration.99 
The amendment is currently waiting to be voted on by the Senate. As any recent 
attempt at federal reform has been stalled, States have elected to take regulation of 
civil asset forfeiture practices into their own hands and continue to amend their asset 
forfeiture policies and procedures.  
C. The Various State Policies Regarding Civil Forfeiture 
Almost all states and the District of Colombia have their own civil forfeiture laws, 
which vary in required procedures and financial incentives.100 When evaluating the 
differences, it is most important to consider “the standard of proof that must be met to 
forfeit the seized property and which party has the burden to prove innocence or 
guilt.”101 State forfeiture laws range from those where nearly forty-percent of law 
enforcement budgets are derived from forfeitures, to outright banning civil forfeiture 
                                                          
 92  Id.  
 93  Id.  
 94  Emmons, supra note 25. 
 95  Id. 
 96  Id. 
 97  Id. 
 98  Id. 
 99  Zaid Jilani, In Surprise Vote, House Passes Amendment to Restrict Asset Forfeiture, 
INTERCEPT (Sept. 12, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/09/12/in-surprise-vote-house-
passes-amendment-to-restrict-asset-forfeiture/. 
 100  Id. 
 101  Id. 
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by requiring a criminal conviction before a person’s property can be seized.102 From 
2010 to 2015, various news outlets released studies and articles highlighting how 
wide-spread forfeiture has become in the United States and how most states’ laws 
violated basic citizen property rights.103 Thankfully, the investigative research 
performed by constitutional rights activist groups did not fall on deaf ears and 
lawmakers began to take note. As of 2015, a study found that “five states (New 
Mexico, Nevada, Montana, Minnesota, and Michigan) and the District of Colombia 
had substantively reformed civil asset forfeiture laws” to provide added protection to 
property owners in accordance with the Constitution.104 Despite a minority of states 
electing to reform their civil asset forfeiture laws, the truth remains that federal and a 
majority of state civil forfeiture regulations continue to put innocent property owners 
at risk.105 
In a study published in 2015, the Institute for Justice found that civil forfeiture far 
outpaces criminal forfeiture.106 The study noted that “[j]ust 13% of Department of 
Justice forfeitures from 1997 to 2013 were criminal forfeitures; 87 percent were civil 
forfeitures.”107 Further, among those civil forfeitures, eighty-eight percent took place 
“administratively.”108 The study further found that “state and local law enforcement 
participation with the federal government via ‘equitable sharing’” skyrocketed in 
recent years and find it unlikely that this trend will reverse.109 Lastly, the Institute 
noted that “most state and federal civil asset forfeiture laws lack even basic 
transparency requirements, leaving the public in the dark about most forfeiture 
activity.”110 
                                                          
 102  Stillman, supra note 59. 
 103  See, e.g., Sallah, supra note 35 (“To examine the scope of asset forfeiture since the terror 
attacks, The Post analyzed a database of hundreds of thousands of seizure records at the Justice 
Department, reviewed hundreds of federal court cases, obtained internal records from training 
firms and interviewed scores of police officers, prosecutors and motorists.”); Carpenter, supra 
note 23, at 3 (“This second edition of Policing for Profit highlights the continued need for 
forfeiture reform. Updated grades for state and federal civil forfeiture laws find that protections 
against unjust forfeitures still range from bad to worse, and too many laws incentivize revenue 
generation over the impartial administration of justice. This edition also shows—with far more 
extensive data than previously available—that law enforcement’s use of forfeiture continues to 
grow. Furthermore, this second edition shines a spotlight on the appalling lack of transparency 
in the use of forfeiture and its proceeds.”). 
 104  Carpenter, supra note 23, at 23. 
 105  Id. at 6. 
 106  Id. at 5. 
 107  Id.  
 108  Id. “Administrative forfeitures happen automatically when a property owner fails to 
challenge a seizure in court,” meaning the cases are never heard before a judge and property 
owners never see a day in court. Id. 
 109  Id. at 6 (“The Department of Justice announced new policies in January 2015 intended 
to curb one type of equitable sharing—federal ‘adoptions’ of locally seized assets. But the 
changes and subsequent clarifications largely left intact another vehicle for equitable sharing—
joint task forces and investigations involving federal law enforcement.”). 
 110  Id. at 7. 
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Unfortunately, deriving in-depth state statistics regarding forfeiture activity is 
impossible due to the lack of public reporting requirements.111 However, the Institute 
determined in 2012 (the last year the most consistent data was available) alone, “state 
and local agencies in 26 states and the District of Colombia took in more than $254 
million through forfeiture.”112 The state of Texas led the states in forfeiture collections 
with “$46 million, followed by Arizona with $43 million, and Illinois with nearly $20 
million.”113 Due to the required filings, fee payments, and court appearances required 
to contest civil asset forfeitures, many property owners never make it to court.114 
Another significant reason property owners fail to contest forfeitures relates to the low 
value of property frequently at stake.115 “For property worth less than $200, a mere 3 
percent of owners attempt to retrieve it, but as the value of seized property increases 
so do the percentage of owners willing to contest an attempted forfeiture.”116 If 
property owners choose to take on the daunting task of reclaiming their property in 
court, state laws often only require prosecutors to meet low standards of evidence due 
to the civil nature of the lawsuit.117 
As part of the study, the Institute assigned grades to each state’s civil forfeiture 
laws, after evaluating the threat the laws posed to innocent property owners.118 Three 
fundamental elements of civil forfeiture laws were examined by the Institute when 
calculating grades: (1) “the financial incentive”; (2) “the standard of proof the 
government must meet to forfeit the property”; and, (3) “whether the burden to prove 
innocence or guilt is on the innocent third-party owners or the government.”119 A high 
grade (i.e., an “A”) from the Institute signified “laws that limit or ban forfeiture 
proceeds directed to law enforcement and offer strong protections to citizens against 
unjust forfeitures.” 120 As a result of investigations performed, an astounding thirty-
five states, or seventy-percent, received a grade of D+ or lower.121 Even worse, the 
                                                          
 111  Id. at 11. 
 112  Id.  
 113  Id.  
 114  Id. at 12. 
 115  Id. (“[T]he Institute for Justice was able to obtain property-level forfeiture data for 10 
states from 2012, allowing median property values to be calculated. In those states, the median 
value of forfeited property ranged from $451 in Minnesota to $2,048 in Utah.”). 
 116  Id. (“In Minnesota, for instance, law enforcement took 34,000 pieces of property, 
including vehicles, cash and homes, between 2003 and 2010—the equivalent of one piece of 
property from every other family in St. Paul, the state capital. Yet over one six-month period, 
66 percent of forfeitures went unchallenged by property owners. Overall, from 2003 to 2010, 
Minnesotans saw the return of their property in just 10 percent of cases.”). 
 117  Id.  
 118  Id. at 14. 
 119  Id. 
 120  Id. at 6.  
 121  Id.  
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Institute found that Federal civil forfeiture laws were some of the worst offenders, 
earning a D-.122 
1. Financial Incentives for Law Enforcement 
Civil asset forfeiture laws create financial incentives for law enforcement when 
the proceeds of forfeited property may be used by the agency enforcing the law with 
little to no restrictions on how those proceeds may to be spent.123 As of 2015, only 
seven states and the District of Colombia prohibit law enforcement from accessing 
proceeds from forfeited assets.124 The remaining forty-three states permit law 
enforcement to use anywhere from forty-five to one-hundred percent of the proceeds 
from forfeited property at their total discretion.125 
2. Standard of Proof 
Those property owners who ultimately decide to challenge a pending forfeiture are 
at a significant disadvantage.126 That disadvantage is a direct result of the low standard 
of proof a prosecutor must meet under civil forfeiture laws.127 As of 2015, thirty-one 
states and the federal government apply the “preponderance of the evidence” standard 
for proof of all civil asset forfeitures, making it the most common standard 
nationally.128 This standard requires law enforcement to show that the property in 
question was more likely than not connected to a crime and is often referred to as the 
“51 percent standard.”129 There are two states, namely Massachusetts and North 
Dakota, that maintain  an even lower standard—requiring only probable cause to 
forfeit an individual’s property.130 On the contrary, in an effort to protect their citizen’s 
constitutional rights, “a growing number of states have begun demanding a higher 
standard of proof for civil asset forfeitures.”131 The lower the standard of proof, the 
                                                          
 122  Id.  
 123  Id.  
 124  Id. 
 125  Id. Note, at the time the study was performed, Ohio permitted one-hundred percent of 
the value of forfeited assets to be used at law enforcement discretion. 
 126  Id. at 16. 
 127  Id. (explaining that the standard of proof is what the government must show to win a 
civil forfeiture case and dictates how convincing the government’s evidence must be to a judge). 
 128  Id.  
 129  Id. (“[M]eaning the evidence must be a bit more than 50-50-or slightly better than a coin 
flip-in favor of the government, a much lower hurdle than beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
 130  Id. (“Probable cause is the same low evidentiary standard that police must meet in order 
to make an arrest, carry out a search or seize property in the first place”). 
 131  Id. at 17. As Carpenter summarized: 
North Carolina requires criminal convictions in most cases. California sets a standard 
of beyond a reasonable doubt to forfeit most kinds of property, with a conviction 
required . . . . In 2015, New Mexico abolished civil forfeiture. It now requires a criminal 
conviction with proof beyond a reasonable doubt for all forfeitures; after securing a 
conviction, the government must prove in the same criminal proceeding that seized 
property is connected to the crime by ‘clear and convincing evidence,’ a standard lower 
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easier the civil forfeiture case becomes for the government to win, resulting in a more 
difficult case for property owners.132  
3. Burden to Prove Innocence or Guilt 
Currently, only ten states and the District of Colombia actually require the 
government to prove the property owner was involved in illegal activity prior to 
forfeiting the property.133 Depending on the state, property owners can be subject to 
civil asset forfeiture without a criminal conviction or can lose their property when 
another individual allegedly uses it during the commission of a crime.134 In the 
remaining forty states, the type of property involved determines which party has the 
burden of proof.135 
III. OHIO CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE LAW 
This Note specifically proposes reform to Ohio civil asset forfeiture laws, 
therefore, it is important to highlight the relevant Ohio Revised Code sections and 
recent amendments thereof. Ohio enacted its first state forfeiture laws in 2007 with 
Section 2981 of the Ohio Revised Code titled “Forfeiture.”136 Ohio legislators made 
few changes to the forfeiture laws initially enacted until gross abuse of power by law 
enforcement was uncovered and reported by the media.137 A study published in 2015 
found that Ohio’s forfeiture laws were among the worst in the country, encouraging 
legislative reform which passed and became effective in 2017.138 The study found 
“that Ohio law enforcement acquired at least $25.7 million” in forfeitures based on 
incomplete records provided by the Attorney General.139 Additionally, the study 
                                                          
than reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of the evidence. Minnesota, 
Montana, Nevada and Vermont now also demand criminal convictions, followed by 
civil trials linking seized property to the crime by clear and convincing evidence. 
Missouri requires a criminal conviction and proof by a preponderance of the evidence 
that seized property is connected to the crime; Oregon law is similar for forfeitures of 
personal property (which account for most forfeitures) but sets a higher standard of clear 
and convincing evidence to forfeit real property. Six states—Colorado, Connecticut, 
Florida, Michigan, New York and Utah—demand that the government provide clear 
and convincing evidence of a property’s connection to criminal activity for most or all 
civil forfeitures. The remaining states and the District of Columbia apply different 
standards to different types of property or under different circumstances. 
 132  Id. at 18. 
 133  Id. at 20. 
 134  Id. at 18. 
 135  Id. at 20 (when the study was released in 2015, in Ohio the burden to prove innocence 
was placed on the property owner. Subsequent to reform in Ohio, the burden to prove had 
subsequently been placed on the government). 
 136  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2981 (West 2017). 
 137  Jackie Borchardt, Ohio Police Can’t Keep Seized Property Until Charges Are Filed, 
Under Bill That Passed Senate, CLEVELAND.COM (Dec. 9, 2016), 
https://articles.cleveland.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/12/civil_asset_forfeiture_reforms.amp. 
 138  Carpenter, supra note 24, at 116. 
 139  Id. at 116 (“Data used within the study included forfeitures from state and local agencies 
provided to the Ohio attorney general and obtained by the Institute for Justice through an Ohio 
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determined that Ohio law enforcement officials were among the worst offenders of 
participating in the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program, “ranking the 
state 43rd nationally.”140 
With little-to-no change in civil asset forfeiture laws in the federal realm, Ohio 
government officials elected to take reform into their own hands.141 In January 2017, 
Governor Kasich signed various amendments into Ohio law governing asset 
forfeiture.142 Under prior law, state and local law enforcement officials were permitted 
to seize property without convicting or even charging an individual with a crime.143 
But now, Ohio joined seventeen other states in recent years that have overhauled their 
civil asset forfeiture laws in response to media investigations and reports from civil 
liberties groups that revealed shocking numbers of individuals who have had their 
cash, cars, and homes seized.144 One of the most notable revisions to Section 2981, is 
the requirement of a criminal conviction before law enforcement can permanently 
confiscate property where property is valued under $15,000, effectively outlawing 
civil asset forfeiture on property valued below this amount.145 Ohio’s recent reform 
also switches the burden of proof from the defendant to the government to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that the property is connected to a crime.146 
A. Financial Incentives for Ohio Law Enforcement 
As previously discussed, financial incentives are created for law enforcement in 
the civil forfeiture realm when the officials enforcing the laws are permitted to keep 
the cash and proceeds of forfeited property and use it with little to no restrictions. 
Recently amended Section 2981.05(D)(1) now bars all civil asset forfeiture 
proceedings for proceeds147 less than $15,000. The Institute of Justice obtained 
forfeiture for ten states and found the median amount seized in a civil forfeiture case 
                                                          
Public Records Act request. The Institute noted that several state agencies did not report to the 
attorney general and several reports contained forfeited vehicles for which no value and/or 
proceeds were listed. The lack of data regarding Ohio forfeitures is a result of the elimination 
of the reporting requirement to the attorney general in 2012.”). 
 140  Id. at 117. 
 141  Nick Sibilla, Ohio Now Requires Criminal Convictions for Many Civil Forfeiture Cases, 
FORBES (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2017/01/04/ohio-now-
requires-criminal-convictions-for-many-civil-forfeiture-cases/#172fbac755cf. 
 142  Id.  
 143  C.J. Ciaramella, Ohio Legislature Passes Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform, REASON (Dec. 
9, 2016), http://reason.com/blog/2016/12/09/ohio-legislature-passes-civil-asset-forf (noting the 
original bill passed by the Ohio house of representatives would have eliminated asset forfeiture 
altogether by barring forfeiture in cases where no conviction was obtained but was softened in 
responses to concerns from law enforcement). 
 144  Id.  
 145  Id.; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2981.05(D)(1) (West 2017). 
 146  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2981.05(D)(3) (West 2017); Ciaramella, supra note 143. 
 147  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2981.01(A)(11)(a) (West 2017). Section 2981.01 defines 
“proceeds” as: “[i]n cases involving unlawful goods, services, or activities, ‘proceeds’ means 
any property derived directly or indirectly from an offense.” Id. “‘Proceeds’ may include, but is 
not limited to, money or any other means of exchange.” Id.  
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“ranged from $451 in Minnesota to $2,048 in Utah.”148 Therefore, this $15,000 barrier 
is likely to deter a significant amount of civil forfeiture proceedings that would have 
otherwise consumed the state court’s time and resources. 
 Further, the legislature amended Section 2981.14(B) as follows: 
 
A law enforcement agency or prosecuting authority shall not directly or 
indirectly transfer or refer any property seized by the agency or authority 
to any federal law enforcement authority or other federal agency for 
purposes of forfeiture under federal law unless the value of the seized 
property exceeds one hundred thousand dollars.149 
 
By forbidding the transfer of property seized to be transferred to federal law 
enforcement agencies unless it exceeds $100,000, this amendment actively 
discourages participation in the “equitable sharing” program under federal law. 
Surprisingly, Ohio lawmakers elected to not revise Section 2981.13(b) which still 
allows for law enforcement agencies conducting the forfeitures to transfer all of the 
cash and proceeds of forfeited property to “the law enforcement trust fund of the 
prosecutor and to the following fund supporting the law enforcement agency that 
substantially conducted the investigation.”150 This leaves room for law enforcement 
agencies to participate in forfeitures with the federal government exceeding statute 
thresholds and keep the proceeds for discretionary use. 
B. Standard of Proof 
The current standard of proof required in Ohio for civil forfeiture proceedings is 
the “clear and convincing evidence” standard.151 Ohio raised the standard as part of 
2017 reform from the “beyond a preponderance of the evidence” standard that is used 
by a majority of states.152 The preponderance of the evidence test is what most 
generally refer to as a “51% test,” requiring a better chance (than not) that the property 
in question was used in the commission of a crime.153 “The clear and convincing 
evidence test requires the government to prove that it is substantially more likely than 
not that the property seized was used in a crime.”154 Although there are no strict 
percentage guidelines, this evidence standard is said to fall somewhere between fifty-
one percent and ninety-nine percent certainty.155 
                                                          
 148  Carpenter, supra note 23, at 169 (States for which data was reviewed included: 
California, Connecticut, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, 
Virginia, and Wyoming). 
 149  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 22981.14(B) (West 2017). 
 150  Id. § 2981.13(b). 
 151  Id. § 2981.05(D)(3). 
 152  Carpenter, supra note 24, at 150. 
 153  What Is “Clear and Convincing Evidence,” ROTTENSTEIN LAW GROUP LLP, 
http://www.rotlaw.com/legal-library/what-is-clear-and-convincing-evidence/. 
 154  Id.  
 155  Id. 
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C. The Government’s Burden to Prove Guilt 
In accordance with Section 2981.05(D)(3), in civil forfeiture proceedings, “the 
state has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence” that the property 
owner received the proceeds involved, the property owner knew or had reasonable 
cause to believe the proceeds were derived from the commission of an offense, and 
that the value of the property in question exceeds $15,000.156 
D. “Reform” in Ohio – What’s Next? 
Speaking on the floor of the Ohio Senate, Senator Kris Jordan said that while 
abolishing civil forfeiture would be “ideal,” the bill still “moves us in the right 
direction.”157 The question is, does it move us far enough in the right direction? Is this 
“policy reform” really in line with the expectations of United States citizens and more 
specifically Ohio constituents? According to a poll last year by the Cato Institute, 
eighty-four percent of Americans oppose property seizures from people not convicted 
of a crime.158 Federal elected officials are recognizing the concerns of their 
constituents, but still failing to fully address them in an attempt to appease law 
enforcement officials.159 
While the reform to Section 2981 of the Ohio Revised Code is a step in the right 
direction, the solution to restoring Ohio citizen’s property rights to those afforded via 
the Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution is easy. Ohio must simply outlaw civil asset forfeiture 
and forbid state officials from participating in “equitable sharing” programs with 
federal law enforcement agencies. A common pain point lawmakers cite when civil 
asset forfeiture reform is unsuccessful is the resistance from law enforcement officials 
killing the bills.160 It is worth noting that the original bill passed by the Ohio House of 
Representatives earlier in 2017 would have eliminated civil asset forfeiture altogether, 
barring forfeiture in cases where no conviction was obtained, but it was softened in 
response to concerns from law enforcement.161 Part IV of this Note further 
substantiates the need to ban civil asset forfeiture in Ohio and provides Ohio 
Lawmakers with a “Plan B.” 
IV. PROPOSAL FOR POLICY REFORM 
Ohio’s civil asset forfeiture laws, while recently amended with property owner’s 
rights in mind, do not provide Ohio citizens with sufficient property protections.162 
                                                          
 156  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2981.05(D)(3)(a)-(c) (West 2017). 
 157  Sibilla, supra note 141 (discussing the recent passage of civil asset forfeiture reform 
passed in Ohio in 2017). 
 158  Emmons, supra note 25. 
 159  Carpenter, supra note 23, at 43. 
 160  Id. at 24; see also Ciaramella, supra note 143. 
 161  Emmons, supra note 25; see also Carpenter, supra note 24, at 24 (“A common refrain in 
the states where reform efforts have been unsuccessful is that resistance from law enforcement 
leaders killed the bills.”). 
 162  Nick Sibilla, Ohio Now Requires Criminal Convictions for Many Civil Forfeiture Cases, 
FORBES (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2017/01/04/ohio-now-
requires-criminal-convictions-for-many-civil-forfeiture-cases/#8b5853255cfa. 
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Not only do they violate Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution, but further 
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. When an individual is deprived of his or her property temporarily, and 
most times permanently, based on laws passed to appease law enforcement and evade 
strict criminal standards of proof, one’s right to due process has been violated. To 
restore fundamental property rights in balance with the Ohio Constitution, the United 
States Constitution, and to promote judicial efficiency, Ohio must outlaw civil asset 
forfeiture.  
A. Plan A: Outlaw Civil Asset Forfeiture in Ohio 
Ohio’s civil forfeiture laws pose a significant threat to the property rights of its 
citizens.163 These laws encourage law enforcement “to favor the pursuit of property 
over the pursuit of justice,” and typically make it impossible to recover seized 
property.164 Further, without meaningful transparency, the public has no way to hold 
law enforcement accountable.165 
To further protect Ohioan’s constitutional property rights, Ohio legislators should 
amend Section 2981.05 of the Ohio Revised Code to outlaw civil asset forfeiture by 
requiring a criminal conviction prior to allowing the seizure of an individual’s 
property. If the property in question is “under suspicion of involvement of criminal 
activity,” to promote due process and judicial efficiency, there should be a crime 
charged for which the property in question can be tied back to. As The Washington 
Post’s Tim Walberg eloquently stated, “[i]n a country founded on principles of due 
process and property rights, no one should be comfortable with a system that allows 
law enforcement to seize personal property without a finding of guilt or, in many cases, 
even leveling a criminal charge.”166 
Additionally, lawmakers should eliminate financial incentives for law enforcement 
officials to take property. This can be accomplished by banning participation in 
“equitable sharing” and requiring transparency in reporting of forfeiture activity and 
spending. Ohio lawmakers should revise Section 2981.14(B) to forbid state and local 
law enforcement agencies from participating in such programs with the federal 
government. Lastly, all funds acquired from forfeitures should be directed to a type of 
State General Fund, as opposed to the current process under Section 2981.13(b), which 
permits one-hundred percent of forfeiture proceeds to be retained by the law 
enforcement agency that seized the property. Laws permitting civil asset forfeiture 
have allowed for corrupt practices to run rampant and have caused innocent 
individuals to lose their property with little hope of return. Ohio must join the other 
                                                          
 163  Carpenter, supra note 24, at 7. 
 164  Id. 
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 166  Tim Walberg, Stopping the Abuse of Civil Forfeiture, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/tim-walberg-an-end-to-the-abuse-of-civil-
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two167 states that have outlawed civil asset forfeiture completely to encourage reform 
across the country. 
1. Unconstitutionality of Section 2981 Under the Ohio Constitution 
Using the legal system to evade higher standards of proof required for criminal 
convictions to seize lawful property is a violation one’s right to freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the Ohio Constitution.168 Article I, 
Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution, which has language almost identical to the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, affords Ohioans coextensive 
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.169 Additionally, prior to the 
issuance of a search warrant, the judicial officer issuing such a warrant must be 
supplied with sufficient information to support an independent judgment that probable 
cause exists for the warrant.170 
With the Constitution’s strong declaration of property rights and State 
constitutions affording similar rights to their citizens, civil asset forfeiture laws seem 
to be a direct violation of what the framers of the Constitution’s intended. Section 
2981.05 of the Ohio Revised Code currently permits law enforcement officers to seize 
property valued at $15,000 or more if they suspect the property was involved in the 
commission of a crime or proceeds thereof.171 This means there is no judicial process 
prior to an individual’s asset being seized which is valued at or above that amount and 
law enforcement officers will commence forfeiture proceedings in an attempt to 
permanently deprive the individual from his or her asset(s).172 To prevent the asset(s) 
from automatically remaining in the government’s possession, the property owner 
must go to court and contest the forfeiture.173 Further, because this is a civil 
proceeding, there is no right to an attorney or trial by jury of one’s peers.174 
The ability to deprive an individual of one’s property valued at $15,000 or greater 
without actually charging anyone with committing a crime clearly constitutes an 
“unreasonable seizure,” in direct violation of the Ohio Constitution.175 Further, 
throughout the trial proceedings, the government is only required to prove beyond 
clear and convincing evidence that the property was used in the commission of a 
crime.176 This is a lower standard that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard requires 
                                                          
 167  Scott Shackford, This Map Details Whether Asset Forfeiture Laws in Your State Are 
Good or Awful, REASON (June 9, 2015), https://reason.com/blog/2015/06/09/this-map-details-
whether-asset-forfeitur (the two states are New Mexico and North Carolina). 
 168  See supra text accompanying note 42. 
 169  See supra text accompanying notes 9 and 42. 
 170  OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14. 
 171  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2981.05(D)(1) (West 2017). 
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 173  Id.  
 174  See supra text accompanying note 44. 
 175  OHIO CONST. art. I § 14; OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2981.05(D)(1) (West 2017). 
 176  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2981.05(D)(3) (West 2017). 
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in criminal cases.177 The two standards of proof should be aligned, requiring the 
government to prove the property was used in the commission of a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If an asset can be seized under civil asset forfeiture law if it is 
“suspected to be involved in the commission of a crime,” the standard of proof should 
align with that of a criminal trial.178  
2. Unconstitutionality of Section 2981 Under the United States Constitution 
Civil asset forfeiture proceedings have long been argued to be violations of due 
process afforded via the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.179 
When faced with due process claims, the Supreme Court in particular has justified its 
unique constitutional treatment of civil asset forfeiture largely by reference to a 
discrete historical practice that existed when the United States was founded.180 As 
Supreme Court Justice Thomas noted in Leonard v. Texas: 
 
An English practice of requiring forfeiture of offending objects used in 
violation of customs and revenue laws “took hold in the United States,” 
where the “First Congress passed laws subjecting ships and cargos involved 
in customs offenses to forfeiture.” Other early statutes also provided for 
the forfeiture of pirate ships. These early statutes permitted the government 
to proceed in rem under the fiction that the thing itself, rather than the 
owner, was guilty of the crime. And, because these suits were in rem rather 
than in personam, they typically proceeded civilly rather than criminally.181 
 
However, Justice Thomas further noted how the historical forfeiture laws were 
significantly narrower than modern ones.182 Based on the large evidence of abuse of 
power under civil asset forfeiture laws across the country, it is unlikely that the seizure 
of an individual’s property, without being required or even charging them with a 
crime, was in line with the Framers of the Constitution’s idea of “property rights.” 
Americans have a right to presumed innocence, making the idea of the government’s 
                                                          
 177  See supra text accompanying notes 119–26. 
 178  In Leonard v. Texas, Justice Thomas noted, “Whether forfeiture is characterized 
as civil or criminal carries important implications for a variety of procedural protections, 
including the right to a jury trial and the proper standard of proof. Indeed, as relevant in this 
case, there is some evidence that the government was historically required to prove its case 
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 848, 849 (2017) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 179  Paul A. Avron, Constitutional Issues Concerning Civil Forfeiture, THE FEDERAL 
LAWYER (Jan./Feb. 2010), http://www.fedbar.org/Resources_1/Federal-Lawyer-
Magazine/2018/JanuaryFebruary/Features/Constitutional-Issues-Concerning-Civil-
Forfeiture.aspx?FT=.pdf. 
 180  Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 848 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 181  Id. at 848–49. 
 182  Id. at 849. 
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seizing property without due process incompatible with the Constitution and our 
founding principles.183 
Civil asset forfeiture proceedings have the potential to entrap innocent citizens, 
which is always a significant risk lawmakers want to avoid. Further, “forfeiture 
operations frequently target the poor and other groups least able to defend their 
interests.”184 Low income individuals are the same groups most burdened by forfeiture 
because they are more likely to use cash than alternative forms of payment, such as 
credit cards, which may be less susceptible to forfeiture.185 They are also more likely 
to suffer in their daily lives while they litigate for the return of a critical item of 
property, such as a car or a home.186 
B. Plan B: Implement Further Restrictions within Section 2981 of the Ohio Revised 
Code 
Unjust forfeitures in Ohio continue and existing laws still incentivize law 
enforcement agencies to focus their efforts on revenue generation.187 Requiring 
criminal convictions in Ohio prior to permitting the seizure of an asset will 
permanently deter Ohio law enforcement officials from further partaking in corrupt 
forfeiture practices against law abiding citizens. If Ohio lawmakers are unable to fully 
outlaw civil asset forfeiture in Ohio, the following revisions to Section 2981 of the 
Ohio Revised Code will move Ohio as far in that direction as possible. The necessary 
revisions to Section 2981 include removing incentives for Ohio law enforcement 
officials to perform civil asset forfeitures, raising the burden of proof the government 
must meet in these proceedings, and enhancing reporting requirements. 
1. Remove Incentives for Ohio Law Enforcement 
“There’s this myth that they’re cracking down on drug cartels and kingpins,” Lee 
McGrath, of the Institute for Justice says.188 “In reality, it’s small amounts, where 
people aren’t entitled to a public defender, and can’t afford a lawyer, and the only 
rational response is to walk away from your property, because of the infeasibility of 
getting your money back.”189 To discourage civil asset forfeiture in Ohio, lawmakers 
should ban state and local law enforcement from participating in the “equitable 
sharing” program created by the CCCA.190 The current applicable section of the Ohio 
revised code permits state and local law enforcement to participate in these “equitable 
sharing” programs when the asset(s) in question are valued at or more than 
                                                          
 183  Watt & Richardson, supra note 2. 
 184  Carpenter, supra note 23, at 53–54; Sallah, supra note 35. 
 185  Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 848. 
 186  Nick Sibilla, Supreme Court Will Decide If Civil Forfeiture Is Unconstitutional, Violates 
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 187  Carpenter, supra note 24, at 3. 
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$100,000.191 Permitting participation in the equitable sharing program effectively 
warrants state and local law enforcement to continue to seize citizens’ property even 
in the face of local bans on the practice, as long as they refer the case to a federal 
agency after the seizure.192  Additionally, Ohio legislators should raise the 
current $15,000 restriction on civil asset forfeiture to $100,000 or higher. The current 
$15,000 limit is entirely too low and can deprive individuals, of life savings, their only 
means of transportation, their homes, and large sums of cash saved up for important 
medical procedures.193 The statute should be revised to truly target those drug lords 
and criminals that civil asset forfeiture laws were directed towards. Lastly, the state’s 
lawmakers should require that all funds law enforcement agencies acquire during 
forfeiture proceedings be redirected to a general state fund. Thus, removing the 
incentive to over seize assets to pad budgets. 
2. Raise the Burden of Proof 
Ohio’s recent reform heightened the government’s burden of proof to the “clear 
and convincing evidence” standard.194 Unfortunately, this increased burden of proof is 
still not at the level required during a criminal trial. As civil asset forfeiture 
proceedings are conducted on the premise that the property in question was involved 
in the commission of a crime or is proceeds thereof, the burden of proof should be that 
required in a criminal trial. This is especially important as civil asset forfeiture 
proceedings do not provide property owners with the right to counsel or trial by jury,195 
therefore, requiring the highest level of proof in these cases is in the best interest of 
property owner’s rights. Expenses could be avoided and judicial efficiency increased 
by simply outlawing civil asset forfeiture altogether, instead of having to determine 
the appropriate standard of proof. 
3. Promote Transparency 
“Most state and federal forfeiture laws lack even the most basic reporting 
requirements, leaving their constituents in the dark regarding most forfeiture 
activity.”196 Inadequate reporting standards make it nearly impossible to hold law 
enforcement agencies accountable.197 Based on a study conducted by the Institute of 
Justice, only fourteen states report on forfeiture revenues for an extended period.198 
Ohio eliminated its reporting requirements in 2012.199 Constituents should demand 
that lawmakers reinstate these reporting requirements to promote transparency. 
                                                          
 191  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2981.14(B) (West 2017). 
 192  Stillman, supra note 59. 
 193  See supra text accompanying note 22; see, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 24; Sallah, supra 
note 35; Stillman, supra note 59. 
 194  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2981.05(D)(3) (West 2017). 
 195  See supra text accompanying note 42. 
 196  Carpenter, supra note 24, at 7. 
 197  Id. 
 198  Id. at 5. 
 199  Id. at 116. 
24https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss2/9
2019] LEGISLATIVE REFORM OR LEGALIZED THEFT? 319 
 
V. CONCLUSION: OHIO CITIZENS MUST DEMAND CHANGE 
To protect Ohioan’s constitutional property rights afforded by Article I, Section 
14 of the Ohio Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, the strongest solution is to outlaw civil asset forfeiture in Ohio. 
Therefore, Ohio citizens must lobby for lawmakers to amend Section 2981.05 of the 
Ohio Revised Code to require a criminal conviction prior to allowing forfeiture 
proceedings to commence, regardless of the value of property in question. 
As civil asset forfeiture is a topic that has gained lawmakers attention only 
recently, with one of the most notorious studies on the subject being published in 
2010,200 persuading an entire state legislature to outlaw a practice viewed so favorably 
by law enforcement may be too daunting a task for Ohio lawmakers. This is especially 
true after substantial reform occurring only early in 2017. That is not to say additional 
reform to Section 2981 is not still needed. Ohio constituents must raise these concerns 
with their local lawmakers and stand up for their constitutional property rights. 
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